Geopolitics, Power and Resources Collide as Global Order Frays

Greenland, minerals and power politics

The panel then turned to Greenland, a region increasingly viewed through the lens of critical minerals and Arctic security.

Giustra dismissed claims that Greenland poses an immediate security risk from Russia or China, arguing instead that resource competition is the real driver. “Greenland has always been open for business,” he said.

“The idea that the US needs to own it to access minerals is simply false.”

Instead, Giustra described Washington’s posture as coercive. “It’s essentially putting a gun to Greenland’s head and saying, ‘We want to buy you.’”

For mining investors, Greenland represents both opportunity and risk.

The island hosts significant deposits of rare earth elements, graphite and other strategic metals essential to clean energy technologies, defence systems and advanced manufacturing. But political uncertainty, including pressure from major powers, complicates development timelines and capital allocation.

Macgregor argued that US ambitions in Greenland and Venezuela reflect more optics than strategy. “This administration loves big gestures,” he said. “But unless you control what happens on the ground, nothing really changes.”

Europe’s energy crisis and deindustrialization

Lottaz traced Europe’s economic strain, particularly Germany’s deindustrialization, back to energy policy decisions, including the shutdown of nuclear power and the loss of Russian gas supplies.

“Political leadership in Europe is increasingly detached from national interests,” he said. “What matters more is positioning within EU and transatlantic institutions.”

That disconnect has direct consequences for resource markets, particularly energy-intensive industries such as metals refining, steel production and battery manufacturing, which depend on stable, affordable power.

Macgregor added that many global institutions, including NATO and the European Union, are approaching “block obsolescence,” forcing investors to rethink long-held assumptions about stability.

Critical minerals and the risk of conflict

As the discussion widened, Giustra pointed to critical minerals as one of the most dangerous fault lines in the emerging world order.

“The intense competition between China and the West over critical minerals is a major factor,” he said. “These are not just economic assets — they’re strategic weapons.”

China currently dominates processing of rare earth elements, lithium chemicals and battery-grade materials, giving it leverage over Western supply chains. Efforts by the US, Europe and allies to secure alternative sources — from Greenland to Africa to South America — are reshaping investment flows across the mining sector.

Giustra warned that history shows transitions between declining and rising powers are rarely peaceful. “The danger of conflict during a shift in world order is extremely high,” he said. “We may already be setting the stage for something far worse.”

Is there room for optimism?

Despite the grim outlook, Lottaz offered cautious optimism, arguing that even strained international systems retain some restraining influence.

“Everyone still claims to operate under the UN Charter, even when they violate it,” he said. “That tells us the idea of international law still matters.”

He also pointed to restraint in conflicts such as Ukraine, noting that NATO has avoided direct war with Russia. “There is still rationality at work. No one wants Armageddon.”

Macgregor closed with a stark reminder for investors and policymakers alike. “Rules only exist if someone enforces them,” he said. “As American power recedes, we’re entering a far more competitive and uncertain world.”

For the resource sector, that uncertainty translates into higher geopolitical risk, but also strategic opportunity. As governments scramble to secure supply chains for energy transition metals, defence materials and critical infrastructure, mining projects once considered peripheral are moving to the centre of global power politics.